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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS 
 Physician Hospitals of America (“PHA”) is a 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) organization formed 
to educate members of the physician-owned hospital community about regulatory and legislative 
issues and to encourage PHA members to advocate for the rights of physician-owned hospitals.  
PHA has approximately 166 member hospitals in 34 different states, comprising both existing 
facilities and physician-owned hospitals in various stages of development.  PHA member 
hospitals are typically enrolled as providers under Medicare and Medicaid programs, with up to 
70% of their case mix stemming from Medicare and Medicaid patients.  The physician owners of 
PHA member hospitals are also providers under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
 PHA is committed to the sanctity of private property as guaranteed by the Constitution, 
especially in relation to the rights of physicians to own and operate hospitals and to provide 
patients with expert, cost-effective, and efficient health care.  In Physician Hospitals of America, 
et al. v. Sebelius, Case No. 6:10-cv-00277-MHS, filed June 3, 2010, in the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division, PHA, along with a member hospital, is challenging 
the constitutionality of § 6001 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(“PPACA”), which singles out for negative treatment physician-owned hospitals from among all 
those owned by persons of any other profession.  Section 6001 retroactively prohibits planned, 
approved, and commenced service facility expansion at approximately 58 Medicare-certified 
hospitals solely because they are owned by physicians, and further prevents the development of 
an additional 84 physician-owned hospitals that would be otherwise eligible for Medicare 
certification.   
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 PHA has an interest in protecting its members directly, and the public indirectly, from 
any unconstitutional healthcare legislation, and thus it has an interest in supporting the 
Commonwealth of Virginia in this action.   
 In the following memorandum, PHA addresses the merits of the Commonwealth’s case 
and in particular the dubious constitutional bases asserted by the Secretary in an attempt to have 
the Court sustain § 1501 of the PPACA, which requires American citizens who are not already 
insured to purchase health insurance coverage.  PHA urges the Court to grant summary judgment 
for the Commonwealth and to enjoin enforcement of the PPACA in its entirety.  
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MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
I. The PPACA’s Individual Mandate to Purchase Insurance Is An Unprecedented and 
Unconstitutional Extension of Federal Power Beyond Congress’s Authority To 
Regulate Interstate Commerce 
 
As noted by the Court, this action turns on the narrow question of “whether or not 
Congress has the power to regulate—and tax—a citizen’s decision not to participate in interstate 
commerce.”  Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615 (E.D. Va. 2010).  
As the Court rightly observed, “no reported case from any federal appellate court has extended 
the Commerce Clause or Tax Clause to include the regulation of a person’s decision not to 
purchase a product, notwithstanding its effect on interstate commerce.”  Id.   
In her response to Virginia’s motion for summary judgment, the Secretary sidesteps the 
central question, suggesting instead that this particular area of commerce, the market for health 
care services, is somehow sui generis.  According to the Secretary, this market, as she defines it, 
is unique because an individual cannot decline to participate in it:   
No person can guarantee that he will divorce himself entirely 
from the market for health care services.  The health care market 
is distinctive in this respect.  Because the minimum coverage 
provision regulates the means of payment in a market in which all 
are participants, the Congressional power to enact it does not in 
any way imply a power to require individuals to participate in 
other markets or to take any other action. 
 
(Def.’s Mem. Opp’n to Pl.’s. Mot. Summ. J. 1) (emphasis added).   
 The Secretary argues that since most Americans will eventually participate in the health 
care services market, they can justifiably be shanghaied into participating now.  Yet there is 
nothing unique regarding the size or economic significance of the health care services market.  It 
is much the same as the markets for other essential goods and services such as food, clothing, 
housing and transportation.  Most Virginians will participate in these markets, to one degree or 
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another, throughout their lives.1  Yet no one would suggest that Congress has unlimited authority 
under the Commerce Clause to mandate the individual purchase of particular food, clothing, 
housing or transportation products.     
 Moreover, to make her point, the Secretary engages in a rhetorical shell game, redefining 
and enlarging the scope of commerce implicated by the health insurance mandate.  This suit 
however, involves only the relatively narrow market for health care insurance, not some broad, 
amorphous market for health care services.  For many Virginians, participation in the latter 
simply does not require participation in the former, and indeed, the Secretary concedes that 
numerous Americans have elected not to purchase health insurance because they do not believe 
that, in their particular situations, the product is worth its cost.  The Secretary tries to save the 
mandate by insisting that these same Americans must eventually purchase health care services of 
some kind.  Based on this expected participation in a broader health care services market at a 
later time, the Secretary believes that all Virginians can be made to engage in a narrower health 
insurance market today.   
 Were the Secretary’s rationale to succeed, there would no longer be any limit on 
Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause to regulate private conduct.  Rather, Congress would be 
empowered to regulate not only those engaged in interstate commerce, but also those who are 
anticipated to participate in commerce.  If Congress can force anyone it deems a potential 
entrant into a market to actually enter and purchase goods and services—on pain of a monetary 
penalty—then there truly is no limit to Congress’s power. The Tenth Amendment—and even 
federalism itself—has become a nullity. 
                                                 
1 Of course the popular media frequently reports, anecdotally, on individuals who have lived to 
old age without ever requiring any health care services; and tragically many Virginians die 
accidental deaths at young ages without having required health care services. 
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Fortunately, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that there are actual limits on 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  “[E]ven under our modern, expansive 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’ regulatory authority is not without effective 
bounds.”  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).  
While it is undoubtedly true that the Congress’s Commerce power has grown far beyond 
the conception of the Framers, see, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court has 
clearly prescribed its limits.  As characterized in Lopez, Congress may regulate only the use of 
the channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or 
things in interstate commerce; and activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.  
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).  However, even if an exercise of the 
Commerce power might otherwise fall within this description, the Court has rejected any 
interpretation of the Commerce power which would transform it into a boundless police power.  
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. 
Here, the mandate does not fall within the permissible range of regulation under the 
Commerce Clause.  A present-day decision to decline to purchase health insurance does not 
affect or embody the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce.  Uninsured 
individuals are purposefully not participating in the health insurance market by choice.  The 
issue of whether these same individuals may someday be in the market for other health care 
services is irrelevant to the Commerce Clause analysis.  While Congress can regulate activities 
substantially affecting interstate commerce, no case has ever recognized the extension of 
Congressional authority to inactivity.  If a citizen chooses to participate in the market for health 
insurance in the future, that participation may then be subject to regulation.  But it remains a 
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citizen’s prerogative to make that affirmative choice, not for Congress to make the choice for 
him.   
The Secretary proposes that Congress’s commerce power have no limit.  Under her 
theory, Congress could subject individuals to its regulatory schemes on the pretext that they are 
potential participants in some amorphous market, subjecting them to whatever compulsions it 
can devise.  As expressed by the Supreme Court in Lopez, “if we were to accept the 
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that 
Congress is without power to regulate.”  514 U.S. at 564. 
II. The Mandate to Purchase Insurance is Not a Valid Exercise of the Taxing Power. 
The Secretary has argued in the alternative that if the mandate to purchase insurance is 
not a valid exercise of the Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, it is nonetheless a 
constitutionally permissible exercise of the taxing power.  (Def.’s Mem. Opp’n to Pl.’s. Mot. 
Summ. J. 19, et seq.)  This argument is similarly unavailing. 
First, the health insurance mandate cannot be saved as an exercise of the taxing power 
because Congress did not intend to exercise that power when it enacted the mandate.  The 
Supreme Court has held that Congress is entitled to deference from the courts with respect to 
which of its powers it purports to exercise.  Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).  
Here, not only does the PPACA expressly define the mandate to be an exercise of the commerce 
power, but the legislative history conclusively demonstrates that Congress considered and 
rejected the use of the taxing power. 
The tortured legislative process which resulted in the enactment of the PPACA was much 
documented in the media.  The passage of the legislation favored by the House of 
Representatives was derailed by the election of Senator Scott Brown—resulting in the House’s 
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passage of the Senate Bill.  The unsuccessful House Bill, designated as H.R. 3962, contained 
language similar to § 1501 of the PPACA.  It too included a mandate to purchase insurance.  A 
key difference, however, is that H.R. 3962 explicitly claimed to exercise Congress’s taxing 
power in order to compel individuals to purchase insurance:   
In the case of any individual who does not meet the requirements of 
subsection (d) at any time during the taxable year, there is hereby imposed 
a tax equal to 2.5 percent of the excess of— (1) the taxpayers modified 
adjusted gross income for the taxable year, over (2) the amount of gross 
income specified in section 6012(a)(1) with respect to the taxpayer. 
 
H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009) (emphasis added).   That language was excluded from the bill 
that passed the Senate. 
 The Secretary makes much in her brief about the democratic process, arguing that this 
Court should refrain from exercising its own authority under the Constitution out of deference 
for the elected branches.  Here, however, the same deference to the legislative process would 
appear to cut off any assertion that the mandate is an exercise of the taxing power.  The elected 
branch of government of which the Secretary is so considerate specifically contemplated 
exercising its taxing power to enforce the mandate, but rejected doing so.  Instead, Congress 
attempted to exercise is power under the Commerce Clause—an attempt which, as described 
above, impermissibly overstepped the bounds of the power granted by that clause. 
However, even if the Court allowed the Secretary to succeed in her counter-factual 
recharacterization of the mandate as an exercise of the taxing power, the mandate still fails.  The 
Supreme Court held in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922), 
that Congress cannot evade the bounds placed on its powers by the Tenth Amendment through 
the mere semantic manipulation of calling a penalty a tax.  In the words of Chief Justice Taft: 
“To give such magic to the word ‘tax’ would be to break down all constitutional  limitation of 
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the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States.”  Id. at 38.  
Further, “[w]here the sovereign enacting the law has power to impose both tax and penalty the 
difference between revenue production may be immaterial, but not so when one sovereign can 
impose a tax only, and the power of regulation rests in another.”  Id.  Here, while Congress has a 
broad power to lay and collect taxes for the purpose of raising revenue, the plenary police power 
required to lawfully enact the mandate to purchase insurance rests with the states. 
To be a valid tax, “the provisions of the so-called taxing act must be naturally and 
reasonably adapted to the collection of the tax and not solely to the achievement of some other 
purpose plainly within state power.”  Id. at 43.  The mandate to purchase insurance fails this test.  
As the Commonwealth aptly points out, if the mandate works as intended, no revenue will in fact 
be collected.  The supposed excise is exacted only upon a class of citizens who decline to follow 
a prescribed course of conduct.  It is thus particularly ill suited for the collection of revenue and 
cannot be sustained under the taxing power. 
The Secretary asserts in her brief that the Child Labor Tax case is no longer good law in 
light of Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).  Although the Court in the Child 
Labor Tax Case had struck down a putative tax as an unconstitutional regulation, a similar claim 
failed in Bob Jones because, unlike in the Child Labor Tax Case, the plaintiffs there filed a 
prospective action to prevent enforcement of the tax, rather than a retrospective action for 
redress.  Id. at 740-41.  If in fact Bob Jones is to have any bearing on the holding of the Child 
Labor Tax Case at all, it is a favorable one, since the Bob Jones Court cites that case with 
approval.  See 416 U.S. at 740-41.  Nevertheless, the Secretary hangs her hat on a footnote in 
Bob Jones which speculates whether distinctions between revenue-raising and regulatory taxes 
have been abandoned. Id. at 741 n.12.  In the footnote, the Court referred to Sonzinsky v. United 
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States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937),  and did not refer to the Child Labor Tax Case at all.  The 
holding of Sonzinsky, of course, did not overrule  the Child Labor Tax Case, but merely limited it 
by pointing out that “an act of Congress which on its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing 
power is not any the less so because the tax is burdensome or tends to restrict the thing taxed.”  
300 U.S. at 513.  In fact, Sonzinsky specifically preserved the holding of  the Child Labor Tax 
Case:  
This case is not one where the statute contains regulatory provisions related 
to a purported tax in such a way as has enabled this Court to say in other 
cases that the latter is a penalty resorted to as a means of enforcing 
regulations.  See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20. 
 
300 U.S. at 513.  Thus there is no credence to the Secretary’s claim that  the Child Labor Tax 
Case is no longer good law.  Absent the rule of  the Child Labor Tax Case, the taxing power 
would become a de facto police power. 
 The mandate to purchase insurance does not on its face even purport to be a tax.  Even if 
it did, the fact that it is not designed to raise revenue but merely to regulate would be necessarily 
fatal to any attempt to sustain its validity under Congress’s taxing power. 
III. The Court Should Enjoin Enforcement of the PPACA in its Entirety. 
  As the Secretary correctly notes, the PPACA is a comprehensive statute that addresses a 
wide variety of issues.  Many, if not most, of  the Act’s substantive effects, however, are in the 
realm of health insurance reform, of which the health insurance mandate is an essential element.  
The Secretary concedes that these reforms—such as guaranteed-issue and community-rating—
cannot be severed from the minimum coverage provision.  However, it is less clear what other 
sections contained in PPACA’s hundreds of pages are truly independent of the minimum 
coverage requirement.  
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 Astonishingly, the Secretary proposes that this Court should—at a later date—undertake 
a “serious severability analysis” of mammoth proportions by separately examining every 
provision of PPACA’s 10 titles, which includes 59 subtitles and more than 450 sections.  The 
proper role of the Court is not to make an individual determination about the desirability of every 
provision of PPACA in light of the excision of § 1501.  The judicial branch is not charged with 
straining to “rewrite” a legislature’s law in a futile attempt to salvage it.  Virginia v. Am. 
Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).  Such analysis and parsing of language is 
“quintessentially legislative” and effectively “substitute[s] the judicial for the legislative part of 
the government.”  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (quoting United 
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)).  Accordingly, the Court should declare the PPACA 
stricken in its entirety and enter an injunction against its enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, the requirement of § 1501 of the PPACA that individual citizens 
purchase health insurance or be subject to a monetary penalty is unconstitutional.  PHA therefore 
requests this Court to grant the Commonwealth’s Motion for Summary Judgment and deny 
Secretary Sebelius’s Motion for Summary Judgment.       
Case 3:10-cv-00188-HEH   Document 122    Filed 10/04/10   Page 13 of 15
 11 
Dated: October 4, 2010   Respectfully submitted, 
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